

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1969

Mr. President:

Before the final instructions go out, I thought you should have an opportunity to review the situation.

If you wish to do so or if you would like to look at the guidance to be sent to Saigon, I am available outside.


Henry A. Kissinger

ARMY, OSD, JCS
reviews completed.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 16, 1969

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Joint Chiefs of Staff Military Operations to Support
Breakfast Plan

General Wheeler called via secure phone at 1:25 p.m. and stated that he had just completed a secure phone conversation with General Abrams who proposed two options in support of Breakfast Plan as follows:

Option I

implement a plan which would provide for:

MACV is prepared to ~~initiate~~ strikes on targets in both the Northern and Southern half of the DMZ starting noon, Monday (Saigon time) utilizing (a) tacair with sky-spot radar control techniques, (b) conventional ground artillery, and (c) naval gun fire bombardment. Under this plan, 60 sorties of B-52 aircraft would be targetted on the combined COSVN 7th Division objective commencing Tuesday morning (Saigon time) while the strikes against the DMZ targets would continue throughout the period. (This Option is obviously favored by the military as one designed to provide maximum military advantage.

Option II

MACV
~~General Abrams~~ is also prepared to implement a plan which would provide for: (a) 18 B-52 sorties against targets in the DMZ commencing Tuesday morning (Saigon time), (b) 42 B-52 sorties against the COSVN headquarters complex starting Tuesday morning (Saigon time) simultaneously with, but started after, the initial strikes on the DMZ, and (c) continuation of the strikes in the Northern and Southern half of the DMZ all day on Tuesday by a combination of tacair (with sky spot techniques), ground artillery and naval bombardment. (Option II appears to provide the most beneficial political scenario to support the Breakfast Plan concept. It obviously reduces

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

the amount of military punishment which would be inflicted. However, it more precisely meets the political objectives which are sought).

General Wheeler is prepared to discuss most of the above options in a meeting with the President, Secretary Rogers, and Secretary Laird and yourself this afternoon. He is preparing implementing instructions designed to implement either course of action. It is necessary that a decision be made today to proceed to insure that required directives are in hand in Saigon in a timely fashion. This is especially true with Option I in that it calls for the initiation of tacair and naval and ground artillery bombardment starting approximately 10:00 p.m. Washington time tonight.

General Abrams is also anxious, under either option, to integrate some ARVN tactical air units into the DMZ operations. It is his belief that the combined U.S. /ARVN attack would provide substantial cosmetic benefits and would do much to facilitate achieving Thieu's consent for the immediate initiation of private talks in Paris. I am inclined to support this position in that it would give Thieu improved leverage in dealing with his local subordinates on the private talks issue.